Taking your time in military operations is not politically bad, and not every urgent victory is strategically useful. We have to keep in mind a very important point that liberation means the safety of civilian hostages who were coerced to be human shields for ISIS.
People are helplessly under fire and whoever wants to escape is killed by ISIS snipers. Every escape attempt has martyrs and injured people as a result and the operation of liberating the West side of Mosul under the pressure of this equation requires an implementable plan for the safety of people and the liberating forces. We have to also assume that the ISIS units that gave up on surviving will fight until the last moment of their lives, producing crises, destruction, and death to everybody around.
The equation is that we need more of special operations forces to be quickly moving under the coverage of helicopters. The more the liberators push ISIS toward the old city and the neighborhoods of Najar and Al-Rifa’i, the faster they will be defeated and the forces will liberate additional areas. Opening the river axis will give a huge momentum and reduce the losses and injuries. As for the incompleteness of relief preparations in the liberation of cities including the camps, and urgent medical and food assistance is the reason behind the catastrophe that affect the people of Western Mosul nowadays. The higher ministry committee and the local and international organizations failed to expect the needs of IDPs from the West side for two reasons:
They are still helping people in the liberated East side of Mosul and the provision of necessary assistance is slow due to multiple intertwined service, legal, and military factors.
They assumed that the scenario of displacement of the West side will be similar to the one of the East side which is a big mistake that cannot be based on reasonable calculations.